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1. Introduction
This paper aims to give a broad overview of the foundations underlying the
Chomskyan approach to linguistics. Instead of focusing on the technical
apparatus and analytical details of either Government and Binding theory
(Chomsky 1981) or the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1993; 1995), I put
the spotlight on how Chomsky changed the research questions and research
agenda of linguistics (section 2).1 In section 3 I clarify some stubborn
misunderstandings which regularly appear about Chomskyan linguistics
in the literature of competing frameworks. Section 4 is dedicated to the
ﬁelds of application and data collecting methods of generative grammar.
Some of the main empirical results of generative syntax are discussed in
section 5.
2. Generative grammar and its relation to transformations
The linguistic theory that grew out of Chomsky’s work is called generative
grammar. In this context, ‘grammar’ refers to all levels of language with a
structure, that is, it includes phonology, morphology and syntax as well as
(compositional, non-lexical) semantics. The foundations of this theory were
1 More technical discussion can be found in Brody’s contribution to this issue (Brody
2019).
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laid down in Syntactic structures (Chomsky 1957). (The newest edition
of this book, Hornstein et al. 2018 – supplemented with several state-of-
the-art chapters reﬂecting on the original book’s impact on the ﬁeld – is
reviewed in this issue in Den Dikken 2019.)
2.1. Transformations
‘Generative grammar’ is also often called ‘transformational generative
grammar’. This is because a substantial amount of work in generative
grammar assumes that the directly observable data constitute a so-called
surface structure, which is derived from a more abstract, not directly
observable deep structure via a conversion mechanism (or mechanisms).
‘Transformation’ is the technical term for this linguistic conversion
apparatus.
Transformations in phonology include insertion, deletion, assimilation,
dissimilation and metathesis. These are illustrated in (1) with examples
from Hungarian.
(1) Deep structure Surface structure
insertion piOµ pijOµ ‘market’
deletion hOjo:-jO-i hOjo:-(j)-i ‘his/her ships’
ship-POSS-ACC ship-POSS-ACC
assimilation EmEl-j-E EmEj-j-E ‘(s)he should lift it’
lift-SBJV-3SG.DEFOBJ lift-SBJV-3SG.DEFOBJ
dissimilation armarium (Latin) Olma:rium (Hungarian) ‘cabinet, cupboard’
metathesis pEhEj-Et pEjh-Et ‘ﬂake (Acc)’
ﬂake-ACC ﬂake-ACC
The best-known syntactic transformation is movement, a conversion that
operates on the word order of phrases and clauses. Let us consider an
example with English PPs. In the basic word order the adposition precedes
its nominal complement.
(2) Kate was talking [PP to the boy]
If we would like to use Kate was talking to X as a predicate of a relative
clause, then the prepositional object must be replaced by a wh- item.
(3) the boy [RC Kate was talking [PP to whom]]
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But in a well-formed relative clause, the wh- constituent must also appear
at the beginning of the clause either as in (4a) or (4b) (or if the preposition
is not fronted, it can also be dropped: the boy Kate was talking to).
a.(4) the boy [to whom Kate was talking]
b. the boy [who Kate was talking to]
Of particular interest is (4b), in which the P and the prepositional ob-
ject are not in the same constitutent, and within the clause, the preposi-
tional object, in fact, precedes the adposition. In transformational gener-
ative grammar such sentences start out as (3), with the wh- item inserted
after the preposition, and then the wh- item is fronted via a movement
transformation. The view that at deep structure the wh- item is inside the
PP explains why to – rather exceptionally for this P – appears to be used
intransitively (at deep structure, it does have a complement).
Generative grammar is often identiﬁed as a grammar that uses trans-
formations. This, however, is mistaken for two reasons. Firstly, transfor-
mations were not introduced by Chomsky: they were already part of the
work of Zellig Harris, Chomsky’s linguistics professor (albeit in the form
of static statements rather than dynamic conversions, cf. Harris 1951, vi).
For instance, Harris derived constituent questions from the corresponding
declarative (kernel) sentences similary to our relative pronoun preposing
examples above (Harris 1957, 317).
Secondly, there are generative grammars that do not use transforma-
tions at all. Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1982) and Head-driven
Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard & Sag 1987) are cases in point: these
are generative frameworks that oﬀer alternatives to Chomsky’s particular
way of thinking about language. Moreover, even within Chomskyan gram-
mar there are so-called representational approaches which do not involve
transformations (see e.g., Brody 1995; 2000; 2002). In these analyses the
information encoded in ‘deep structure’ and ‘surface structure’ are part of
the same syntactic representation. In the case of constituent questions, for
instance, the wh- constituent is inserted at the beginning of the sentence;
and the position that a corresponding non-wh- item would occupy in a
declarative clause is ﬁlled by an unpronounced pronominal element that is
co-indexed with the interrogative phrase. All transformational analyses can
be rendered with such representations, as derivations and representations
are essentially just notational variants of each other. As Hale (1999, 1)
put it, they are ‘formally equivalent, mutually intertranslatable ways of
characterizing sets of linguistic expressions’.
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To summarize, transformations were not introduced by generative
grammar, and they are not necessarily part of a generative grammar either,
so they cannot be the real innovation brought by generative grammar.
2.2. The real novelty of generative grammar
A generative grammar is a grammar which models language with formal
and explicit rules. It can generate (or predict the grammaticality of) all
grammatical expressions in the language but does not over-generate, that
is, its rules do not output any ungrammatical expressions. In addition, it
can also explain the logical problem of language acquisition.
The logical problem of language acquisition (also called the poverty of
stimulus or Plato’s problem) means that any child with a normal develop-
ment can learn any language with equal ease, without explicit instruction,
while the linguistic input is poorer in both quantity and quality than the
grammar arrived at at the end of the acquisition process. Diﬀerently put,
the input under-determines the ﬁnal acquired grammar; speakers know
rules of their language that they could not have deduced just on the basis
of the input.2 Rules which cannot be acquired only on the basis of the
input fall into two types: those concerning the grammaticality of sentences
and those concerning the interpretation of sentences. Let us illustrate both
types of rules.
As for rules aﬀecting grammaticality, let us start with the observation
that English is not a pro-drop language: as a rule, neither subject nor
object pronouns can be silent. Thus while (5c) is grammatical, it is an
elliptical sentence.
a.(5) I know this/that.
b. I know that you saw him.
c. I know.
2 That speakers make use of hierarchy-based generalizations in contexts for which data
are not available has been particularly clearly shown by the artiﬁcial language learn-
ing experiments of Culbertson & Adger (2014), in which critical syntactic evidence for
the tested construction was deliberately withheld from the participants. The poverty
of stimulus, of course, does not mean that the input is not critical for language ac-
quisition; without input, there cannot be any language acquisition. It is not the case
either that no rule of a language can be learned on the basis of only the input. The
basic word order or the case-alignment system of a language, for instance, can be
learned by relying only on the input. The poverty of the stimulus means that not all
linguistic rules are like this.
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However, pronominal objects can be dropped in some embedded clauses,
such as (6b).
a.(6) *they understood this [without knowing ]
b. What did they understand [without knowing ]?3
While the language acquirer may conclude from the contrast between (6a)
and (6b) that a constituent question in the matrix clause licenses object
drop in the embedded clause, the rule is not so simple: in (6b) a subject
wh- question in the matrix does not allow for object drop in the downstairs
clause.
(7) *Who understands this [without knowing ]?
Moreover, (8a) and (8b) are also grammatical, but they contain no con-
stituent question.
a.(8) the things which they understood [without knowing ]
b. It is THIS FACT that they understood [without knowing ].
In (6b), the object of the superordinate clause is a wh- element, in (8a)
it is a relative pronoun, and in (8b) it is focused. What is common to
the distribution of interrogative phrases, relative pronouns and focussed
phrases is that they are logical operators, and they have to the preposed
to a left-peripheral position in the clause. As the basic word order in SVO,
in the superordinate sentences in question the object is not in its default
post-verbal position. That position is occupied by a ‘gap’ (in derivational
approaches, the trace of the moved phrase, while in representational ap-
proaches a null pronominal element). This post-verbal ‘gap’ is what licenses
the pro-drop of object pronouns in the relevant sentences. Gaps in embed-
ded clauses which depend on an operator-related gap in the higher clause
(such as pro-drop of English object pronouns) are called parasitic gaps.
The rules governing the distribution of parasitic gaps would be ex-
tremely diﬃcult to acquire based on the input alone. The language learner
would have to hear very many examples to arrive at the conclusion that
object drop is licensed by an operator-related object gap in the higher
clause, and an operator-related subject gap, for instance, is not suﬃcient
for this purpose (9).
3 Cf. the title of Christopher Barzak’s novel The Love We Share Without Knowing for
a similar naturally occurring example.
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a.(9) *the boys who understood this [without knowing ]
b. *It is only JOHN that understood this [without knowing ]
It is, however, extremely unlikely that the child would hear enough (or
even one) relevant example(s) to be able to distill this rule from the data.
Yet at the end of the language acquisition process every native speaker
knows whether parasitic gaps are allowed in their grammar in general
and in individual sentences in particular. Parasitic gaps thus constitute
an important argument for the poverty of stimulus (cf. Adger 2015b and
Allott & Rey 2017, among others).
Let us now turn to rules aﬀecting the interpretation of sentences.
Consider (10), which contains the wh- pronoun where in the matrix clause.
(10) Where did John say that Mary should get oﬀ?
(10) is ambiguous: ‘where’ can be understood to belong to the matrix clause
(asking about the place of saying) or to the embedded clause (asking about
the place of getting oﬀ).
(11) is largely parallel to (10) on the surface, but this time Mary is a
stuctural focus in the embedded clause.
(11) Where did John say that it is Mary that should get oﬀ?
In contrast to (10), however, (11) is not ambiguous. ‘Where’ must be un-
derstood to belong to the matrix clause (‘where did John say’); asking
about the embedded event (‘where should Mary get oﬀ’) is not an avail-
able interpretation. Based on the input alone, it would be very diﬃcult
to ﬁgure out for the language learner that the latter reading is squarely
excluded and it is not the case that this is an ambiguous sentence but all
similar sentences of this type that s/he has encountered so far acciden-
tally happened to have the ‘upstairs interrogative’ reading. Minimal pairs
like (10) and (11) thus constitute another type of strong argument for the
povery of stimulus (see also Hoekstra & Kooij 1988 and Newmeyer 2013,
among others).4
Generative grammar holds that the reason why language acquisition
can be successful in spite of the poverty of stimulus is that humans have an
innate capacity for language. This capacity is species-speciﬁc, i.e., unique
to humans, and it is domain-speciﬁc, that is, it is specialized for language
4 For further discussion of the povery of stimulus and language acquisition, I refer the
reader to Marino & Gervain (2019) in this issue.
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and is not involved in other cognitive tasks. This innate language capacity,
called the language faculty, codes properties which characterize all possible
human languages. As these properties do not have to be learned, the child
has a head-start in the language acqusition process. When the data under-
determine a particular rule, the language faculty helps to narrow down
the hypothesis-space. The human language faculty is often referred to as
Universal Grammar.
The radical novelty of Chomsky’s generative grammar is that it gives
center stage to the child’s language acquisition ability, and in doing so, it
uses formal and explicit rules.5 The core question of generative grammar
is how children can learn language, therefore when the linguist formulates
grammatical rules, it is important to consider if it is realistic for children to
learn the rule in that form. If it is not, then the rule has to be re-formulated
or replaced even if it is empirically perfectly adequate in its original form.
This makes for a sharp contrast with American Structuralism, the imme-
diate predecessor of generative grammar. In the structuralist approach the
central problem was what rules the linguist had to formulate to correctly
capture the data. Whether the rules could realistically be part of speakers’
competence in the form given by linguists was not an issue.
To summarize, the aim of generative grammar is to understand the
human linguistic capacity and the mind that has this capacity. The object
of inquiry is thus linguistic competence (Internal-language) rather than
linguistic performance (External-language).6 The study of individual lan-
guages is ultimately just a tool to discover the properties of the human
mind. The shift in focus from language as used in society to language in
the individual’s mind also signiﬁcantly contributed to the cognitive turn
in psychology, detailed in Pléh’s (2019) contribution to this issue.
To achieve this goal, generative grammar studies individual languages
and the language faculty with the scientiﬁc method that also character-
izes the natural sciences. After examining the data the initial hypotheses
(linguistic rules) are set up. A good hypothesis has predictions, which are
tested on a wider range of data, and if necessary, the hypothesis is ﬁne-
tuned or completely replaced with a new one. The predictions of the reﬁned
hypothesis are subject to testing again. The process continues until the rule
can generate all the relevant grammatical examples but at the same time
5 The child’s language learning ability was also important for Descartes, but he did
not provide a formal theory of this ability.
6 This is why generative grammars could not contend themselves with relying exclu-
sively on coropora. While corpora provide very useful information about language,
they can open a window only on performace.
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it does not over-generate. This process allows the researcher to make a lot
of new empirical discoveries which would not have been possible with the
methods of traditional descriptive linguistics. Thus in addition to propos-
ing abstract formal models of language, generative grammar also enriches
our empirical knowledge of language.7
3. Recurring misunderstandings
Several central tenets of generative grammar are routinely misunderstood
or misrepresented by the critiques of the framework. In this section we will
discuss three such misunderstandings in detail, and clarify what the actual
claims and predictions are.
3.1. The language faculty
In the previous section we have seen that according to generative gram-
mar, humans have an inborn, species- and domain-speciﬁc capacity for
language. This hypothesis makes several predictions, discussed in e.g., Al-
lott & Rey (2017). Firstly, innateness predicts that any child with a normal
development can learn any human language with equal ease. However, not
all artiﬁcial languages could be learned: those which do not conform to the
properties coded in the language faculty would be unlearnable. A case in
point would be languages with rules that make reference to linear order
rather than structural hierarchy. Artiﬁcial langugages that ﬁt this descrip-
7 A good example of just how much empirical contribution generative grammar can
make is the Comprehensive Grammar Resources book series edited by Henk C. van
Riemsdijk, István Kenesei and Hans Broekhuis. This series comprises multi-volume
grammars of idividual languages, focusing on syntax and morpho-syntax. While they
build on knowledge aﬀorded by theoretical linguistics, the grammars are strictly
descriptive and are accessible for linguists of all theoretical persuasions. The series
goes into empirical detail never seen before: the Syntax of Dutch is now complete with
eight volumes, 4676 pages (Broekhuis & Keizer 2012, Broekhuis and Den Dikken 2012,
Broekhuis 2013a;b; Broekhuis et al. 2015; Broekhuis & Corver 2015; 2016; 2019),
and the ﬁrst two volumes, 1218 pages, of the Syntax of Hungarian have also been
published (Alberti & Laczkó 2018a;b). Work on the Syntax of Mandarin Chinese and
other languages are also on their way. The internal organization of the individual
volumes is identical regardless of the language described, which aids cross-linguistic
comparative work.
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tion have indeed been shown to be unlearnable qua language proper (Smith
& Tsimpli 1995).8
Secondly, the species-speciﬁc qualiﬁcation predicts that animals, in-
cluding primates, cannot learn language (where language is understood as
the use of a ﬁnite set of basic building blocks to produce a potentially in-
ﬁnite set of complex structures). To this date, no compelling evidence has
emerged that primates or other animals have the capacity for the discrete
inﬁnity seen in human language.
Thirdly, the domain-speciﬁc qualiﬁcation predicts the possibility of
speciﬁc language impairment, that is, cases in which a child has diﬃcul-
ties with acquiring language without having auditory or speech-production
problems or any other physical or cognitive disorders or delays. Some chil-
dren indeed have such problems which aﬀect only language (cf. Gillam &
Kamhi 2010 for an overview).
Fourthly, having a speciﬁc capacity for language is also a necessary
(though not suﬃcient) condition for having a critical period for language
acquisition, the existence of which is well known (see Hartshorne et al. 2018
on some of the latest results). There are also predictions regarding speciﬁc
linguistic phenomena: for instance, all non-local (i.e., long-distance) lin-
guistic dependencies are predicted to have identical properties regardless
of whether they occur in wh- dependencies, relative clauses, etc. (see sec-
tion 5).
There are, however, several predictions which are wrongly attributed
to generative grammar. For instance, an innate capacity for language does
not mean that this capacity must be localized in a speciﬁc part of the
brain: there exist innate abilities which are not localized (see Bates 1994).
Complex information processing, such as language, generally involves dis-
tinct areas of the brain working together (Kandel & Hudspeth 2013, 16).
Kandel and Hudspeth (ibid., 17), in fact, state that ‘we now think that
all cognitive abilities result from the interaction of many processing mech-
anisms distributed in several regions of the brain. Speciﬁc brain regions
are not responsible for speciﬁc mental faculties but instead are elemen-
tary processing units’ (original emphasis). An innate capacity for language
does not mean that there is a ‘language-gene’ either (Mendívil-Giró 2018).
Having a language faculty means that some cognitive functions are
specialized for language. This, however, does not mean that they must
be unrelated to more general cognitive principles. Adger and Svenonius
8 In additon, Tettamanti et al. (2002) and Musso et al. (2003) show that learning arti-
ﬁcial languages with rules operating on linear order lead to diﬀerent brain activation
patterns than learning languages with hierarchically deﬁned rules.
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(2015, 11), for instance, raise the possibility that linguistic principles such
as Merge, the silence of copies or periodical transfer of structure to the
interfaces may be ‘language-specialized versions of very general cognitive
and computational factors’ rather than enitrely language-speciﬁc principles
with no analogues elsewhere in cognition.
An inborn language faculty predicts that certain very basic proper-
ties will be shared by all natural languages. Crucially, this does not mean
that languages will not have important diﬀerences, too, or that ‘all lan-
guages are like English’. The aim of generative grammar is to understand
what is common to all human languages and what the points of paramet-
ric variation are. These objectives are also reﬂected in the name Princi-
ples and Parameters Theory (used for the Chomskyan framework in the
60’s through the 80’s): the principles are the invariant, shared properties
and the parameters are the properties subject to cross-linguistic variation.
Given this dual goal, generative grammar is necessarily a comparative en-
terprise rather than English-centric (as is often claimed).
As already mentioned in section 2, the language faculty is often re-
ferred to as Universal Grammar. In everyday use, a ‘grammar’ lists the
inventory of the (phonological, morphological and syntactic) categories of
a particular language together with the rules that govern their distribu-
tion. This use of ‘grammar’ is thus tightly related to surface phoneme,
morpheme and word order. Universal Grammar, however, is not a ‘gram-
mar’ in this sense: it encodes the general organizational principles of human
language and makes no reference to surface order. One of these general lin-
guistic principles is that syntactic rules cannot make reference to phonolog-
ical features (e.g., rounded, voiced), but phonological rules (e.g., English
wanna contraction) can make reference to syntactic structures. Another
such principle is Endocentricity: a syntagm comprising categories A and
B will itself belong to category A or B rather than a third, unrelated cat-
egory, e.g., C or D. For instance, the verb run and the nominal phrase the
race can be combined into the phrase run the race. This syntagm shares
its category and external distribution with run, one of its sub-components.
A verb and a nominal phrase could not combine into a syntagm with an ex-
ocentric AP or PP label. What we can conclude from this is that Universal
Grammar is not a ‘grammar’ in the usual sense: it codes structural, hier-
archial properties of language rather than surface order. We shall return
to this point in section 3.3.
Another misunderstanding relating to the language faculty is that
generativists consider language to be similar to the instincts found in the
animal kingdom. In the title of his widely read popular science book, Steven
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Pinker indeed refers to language as an ‘instinct’ (Pinker 1994). This is
a metaphor, however, which should not be taken literally.9 Instincts are
involuntary reactions to stimuli, they need not be learned and remain
unchanged throughout the individual’s lifespan. Language, on the other
hand, is acquired via learning (even if this is a special type of learning),
and the child’s grammar constantly changes until the end of the acquisition
process. The language faculty is thus not an instinct in generative theory
either (see Adger 2015a).
3.2. Recursion
The term ‘recursion’ has (at least) two diﬀerent uses in the generative
literature. Category recursion means that a grammatical category () can
have among its sub-constituents a category of the same type (that is, one
with the label ). This type of recursion is also known as self-embedding.
One of the best-known examples of category recursion is the ability of ﬁnite
clauses to contain ﬁnite clauses within themselves.
a.(12) Holmes loves Irene.
b. Watson thinks that Holmes loves Irene.
c. Mrs. Hudson says that Watson thinks that Holmes loves Irene.
Category recursion may not occur in every language, and within a lan-
guage, its availability depends on the properties of individual lexical items
(for instance, some verbs take a clausal complement while others do not).
Grammatical recursion is a completely diﬀerent notion, entirely un-
related to categories. It means that humans can use a ﬁnite set of basic
building blocks (morphemes, words) to build a potentially inﬁnite set of
structures. The tool for this is called Merge. Merge takes two linguistic
units, A and B, and combines them into a larger linguistic unit, C. In the
next step Merge can combine C with a new unit, D, to create an even
larger unit. That is, Merge can use its output in the previous round of ap-
plication as an input in the next round of application. For instance, gray
9 This should be clear from p. 18 of Pinker’s book: ‘Language is a complex, specialized
skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious eﬀort or formal
instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively
the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process
information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have
described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and
a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term “instinct”.’
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and cat can be combined into gray cat, and this output can be Merged
with this to create this gray cat, which can again be Merged with meows
to produce this gray cat meows. This means that grammatical recursion
characterizes the linguistic computational system a such.
Hauser et al. (2002) claim that recursion is part of Universal Gram-
mar, that is, the human language faculty. Several critiques of generative
grammar have argued that recursion cannot be a universal property of
human language because there are languages which apparently have no
clausal embedding (e.g., Everett 2005; Evans 2014, cf. also Christiansen &
Chater 2015).10 Firstly, self-embedding is not restricted to ﬁntie clauses:
inﬁnitives may also embed inﬁnitives, NPs may embed NPs, PPs may em-
bed PPs, etc. Lack of clausal embedding thus does not automatically mean
that the language in question lacks self-embedding as such. Secondly, even
if languages without any self-embedding exist, they are irrelevant to Hauser
et al.’s claims. Hauser et al. talk about grammatical recursion: the proposal
is that all languages are such that they have a ﬁnite set of building blocks
which can be used to produce a potentially inﬁnite set of structures.11 They
make no claim about category recursion, thus languages without it cannot
be brought to bear on the existence or nature of the language faculty (cf.
Arsenijević & Hinzen 2012; Chomsky 2014, Chomsky et al. to appear, fn.
4, Mendívil-Giró 2018).12
10 The most famous of these is the Brazilian indigenous language Pirahã, which, accord-
ing to Everett (2005), lacks embedded clauses. With detailed analysis of the data,
Nevins et al. (2009) have shown that this view cannot be upheld. Interestingly, in
his earlier work Everett also described Pirahã as a language with embedded clauses
(Everett 1983, chapter 14), but Everett (2005) makes no reference to this fact and
does not explain why that earlier analysis was wrong; the lack of clausal embedding
is stated rather than argued for.
11 Cf. the following quote from p. 1571: ‘All approaches agree that a core property of
FLN [Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense; É.D.] is recursion, attributed to
narrow syntax […] FLN takes a ﬁnite set of elements and yields a potentially inﬁnite
array of discrete expressions. This capacity of FLN yields discrete inﬁnity […]’.
12 Everett (2019) tries to address this issue, but the argumentation is unsatisfying. Ev-
erett tries to re-phrase Hauser et al.’s claim that ‘recursion = Faculty of Language’
in diﬀerent ways. Three of these ((a) ‘If humans have language, then they think
recursively’, (b) ‘If humans think recursively, then they have language’ and (c) ‘If
humans do not think recursively, then they have no language’) are again irrelevant
because they confuse the formal properties of syntax (something Hauser et al. do
make a claim about) with the way humans think (something Hauser et al. make no
claim about). Two further paraphrases ((d) ‘All languages have recursion’ and (e) ‘If
humans have language, then they have recursive syntax’) are relevant. These, how-
ever, are once again rejected on the basis of the alleged lack of recursivity in Pihahã,
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3.3. Linguistic universals
The term ‘universal’ is also used in two diﬀerent senses in the literature.
Typological universals (also called Greenberg universals) are generaliza-
tions concerning surface word order which appear to hold in every lan-
guage. One of the best known examples is Greenberg’s Universal 20 (Green-
berg 1963), which states the possible orders of demonstratives, numerals
and adjectives with respect to each other and the noun in the Noun Phrase.
Greenberg’s generalization is that prenominally only the Dem-Num-A-N
order is found cross-linguistically as a neutral order, while post-nominally
both N-Dem-Num-A and N-A-Num-Dem occur.13 Such universals can be
established on the basis of descriptive linguistics.
The universals of Universal Grammar (also known as Chomsky univer-
sals) are not concerned with word order: they characterize the human lan-
guage faculty and the underlying hierarchical structure of language. Such
a universal is the Principle of Endocentricity already mentioned above,
Principles A, B and C of the Binding Theory (which regulate the hierar-
chical relationship between a Noun Phrase and an anaphor, pronoun or
referential expression co-referent with it) or the Empty Category Principle
(which places well-formedness constraints on traces). The ﬁne details of
these principles need not concern us here, what is important is that they
are about structural relationships rather than word order, and they can
only be identiﬁed via structural analysis of linguistic data.
Typological universals are usually borne out as a tendency; they are
hardly ever without any exceptions. This fact has led some to the conclu-
sion that there cannot be a Universal Grammar either (Tomasello 2005;
Evans 2014, chap. 3, among others). This line of thinking confuses typo-
logical universals with Chomsky universals, however (see also Hornstein
2013, fn. 4, Adger 2015a). As explained above, Chomsky universals are
about structural relationships. The idea that languages share hierarchical,
organizational traits does not predict shared surface word order properties
(just like the shared structural property of a backbone does not predict
similarities between the appearance of ﬁsh, amphibians, reptiles, birds and
thus the Author still fails to make a distinction between grammatical recursion and
category recursion.
13 Later work has uncovered that the post-nominal part of this generalization does not
hold in this form: Hawkins (1983) suggests that there are no constraints on post-
nominal order, while according to Cinque (2005) more post-nomial orders occur, yet
there are logically possible but unattested neutral orders post-nominally, too. The
pre-nominal part of the original generalization remains uncontested, however.
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mammals). The idea that humans have Universal Grammar (i.e., a lan-
guage faculty) can be refuted, but only by showing for all proposed Prin-
ciples that they do not hold in all languages.
4. Fields of application and methods
In its early days generative grammar was mostly applied in the synchronic
study of syntax and phonology. Since then, the theory has been adopted in
morphological and diachronic analyses14 as well as in the study of sign lan-
guages, heritage languages, dialectal micro-variation, (monolingual, bilin-
gual and L2) language acquisition and language deﬁcits (e.g., aphasia and
SLI). Data from these diﬀerent ﬁelds constantly inform the theory and
improve its hypotheses.
The data themselves have a variety of sources. In addition to uti-
lizing introspection and grammaticality judgments from native speakers,
data also come from corpora, from (picture or video prompt based) di-
rected production tasks and from psycho-linguistic experimental methods
(including eye-tracking). All of these sources have usefulness and validity
as well as limitations.
Grammaticality judgments as a source of data has long been in criti-
cized on two major fronts by proponents of alternative frameworks. Firstly,
such judgments are often regarded to be unstable and non-replicable. How-
ever, introspective judgments have been shown to be stable, reliable and
replicable (Cowart 1997; Sprouse & Almeida 2012; 2013). To be sure, there
are better and less good ways to collect such judgments. Instead of asking
for a binary grammatical versus ungrammatical decision, a seven-point
Likert scale, the magnitude estimation methodology or continuous slid-
ers can be applied, instructions should be carefully formulated and both
subject-related and task-related factors should be controlled for (Schütze
1996; Sprouse & Almeida 2017; Marty et al. 2019, among others).15 While
these issues should be paid heed to, there is no reason to abandon gram-
maticality judgments (and as we shall see below, it is not even possible if
we want to pursue the goals of generative grammar).
The second major point of criticism is that sentences which speakers
are asked to judge are often not natural and do not occur in spontaneous
14 In this issue Lightfoot (2019) analyzes the eﬀect of Chomskyan linguistics on di-
achronic studies.
15 Good practices to follow whith speakers of non-standard varieties can be found in
Cornips & Poletto (2005).
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communication (Tomasello 1998; Miller & Weinert 1998). This claim is fac-
tually wrong: Newmeyer (2010) shows that sentences with a highly complex
structure do occur in natural spontaneous communication, we just have to
use a large enough corpus to ﬁnd them.16 Furthermore, the structures ap-
pearing in spontaneous conversations and written registers are, in essence,
identical; the detectable diﬀerences are quantitative rather than qualita-
tive (Biber 1988). The claim about the absence of complex constructions
in spontaneous language use is also misguided and irrelevant. Generative
grammar aims to model the language faculty: its object of inquiry is what
is possible rather than what actually occurs.
This brings us back to the issue already mentioned above: grammat-
icality judgments are essential in order to tap into the language faculty
of speakers. As discussed in Schütze (1996), work relying exclusively on
corpora cannot reliably ﬁlter out noise in the data, cannot identify con-
structions which are grammatical but happen not to be represented in the
corpus by accident, and lack crucial negative information about grammar
(i.e., cannot identify with certainty what is ungrammatical).
Constructed examples which speakers assess for acceptability can pro-
vide negative information and have the advantage that they contain only
the target construction, thus superﬂuous structural components which po-
tentially have an adverse eﬀect on processing but at the same time are not
relevant to the studied issue are eliminated.
Constructed examples should be thought of as controlled experiments:
with them we create the conditions under which a particular object of study
can occur, such that we can observe, study and understand it, and check the
predictions of the theory. In the natural sciences it is self-evident that such
experiments are necessary. For instance, nobody would chide physicists
for building the Large Hadron Collider in order to create a controlled
environment in which they can bring about and observe the phenomena
of interest to them. Little to no progress could be expected if they would
just wait for those phenomena to occur spontaneously instead. Constructed
examples work analogously to the experiments of the natural sciences: they
help us establish the limits of what is possible in human language. It is
hard to imagine how any theory of language could be seriously pursued
without knowledge of this.
16 Newmeyer uses the Fisher English Training Transcripts for his study, which con-
tains transcripts of telephone conversations (more than 6,700,000 words). He shows
that among the complex constructions occurring in natural speech are cross-clausal
wh- dependencies (discussed in the next section), deeply embedded gaps in relative
clauses, backward anaphora, gerunds with possessive subjects, gapping (ellipsis of the
verb), sluicing (ellipsis after a wh- phrase), etc.
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5. Some empirical results of generative linguistics
As already discussed in section 2, generative grammar has made both
theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of language.
In footnote 7 we mentioned the Comprehensive Grammar Resources series
as an example of an empirical contribution to the description of particular
languages. In this section we will look at some of the signiﬁcant mid-
level syntactic generalizations which came out of work in generative syntax
(including Government and Binding Theory, LFG as well as HPSG) and
which could not have been discovered without the methods and goal of
generative linguistics. The full list of the 53 generalizations, which can be
found in the unpublished notes of Svenonius (2016) and D’Alessandro (to
appear), was drawn up collectively by the participants of the Generative
Syntax in the 21st Century: The Road Ahead conference in 2015 in Athens.
5.1. Uniﬁed constraints on preposings to the left-periphery
We have seen in (4a) and (4b) that relative pronouns in English appear
at left periphery of the clause and are associated to a gap further down in
the sentence. In many languages contrastive foci, topics and interrogative
phrases are also preposed. While traditional grammars have treated these
types of preposings as entirely unrelated types of dependencies, genera-
tive grammar has uncovered that they are governed by the same types of
rules. It is true for all of them, for instance, that if the preposed phrase
is doubled by an element clause-internally, then that element is always a
pronoun rather than a particle specialized for doubling (Ross 1967).17 (13)
illustrates this with topic-doubling in English.
(13) John, I like him very much.
Wh- phrases, contrastive foci, topics and relative phrases can also be pre-
posed into structurally higher clauses. The resulting cross-clausal depen-
dencies are also similar in nature (they are subject to the same licensing
conditions, cf. section 5.2, and are blocked in the same types of environ-
ments, see section 5.3). Preposed wh- phrases, contrastive foci, topics and
relative phrases thus form a natural class (Chomsky 1977).
17 This is true in spite of the fact that topic, focus and relative particles are deployed
on the clausal left periphery in several languages.
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5.2. Cross-clausal dependencies
We have seen that constituents may be syntactically and semantically re-
lated to positions other than their surface position. A special instantiation
of this possibility is when a constituent appearing in the matrix clause is
syntactically and interpretationally related to the embedded clause.18 This
is the case with the interrogative phrase in (14b), for instance.
a.(14) They would like [us to vote for John].
b. Who would they like [us to vote for ]?
Cross-clausal dependencies must always be licensed by special matrix pred-
icates (the so-called bridge verbs of Ross 1967). Furthermore, if cross-
clausal dependencies are allowed between a matrix clause and its comple-
ment clause, then they are also allowed between a matrix clause and the
complement clause of its complement clause, and so on. In other words,
cross-clausal dependencies are unbounded; grammar does not count. (15)
illustrates this with constituent questions.
a.(15) Who did you hear [that they would like [us to vote for ]]?
b. Who did you hear [that they said [that they would like [us to vote for ]]]?
Unboundedness characterizes long-distance interrogative, topic, focus, and
relative dependencies alike. Importantly, similar cross-clausal dependencies
are unattested with ﬁnite verbs. While ﬁnite verbs can leave the verb
phrase, as illustrated in (16b) and (16c), their dependencies are always
clause-bound.
a.(16) Probably John does not [V P like Mary].
b. Probablement Jean (n’) aime pas [VP Marie].
probably Jean not love not Marie.
‘Jean probably does not love Marie.’ (French)
c. Wahrscheinlich liebt Hans [VP Maria] nicht.
probably loves Hans Maria not
‘Probably Hans does not love Maria.’ (German)
18 Derivational theories call this long movement; traditional grammars sometimes refer
to this phenomenon as sentence intertwining.
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5.3. Limits on cross-clausal dependencies: syntactic islands
While long-distance dependencies are potentially unbounded, they can
only be established across particular types of syntactic domains (Ross
1967). Complement clauses, as we have seen, are permeable for cross-
clausal dependencies.
(17) Who did John say [that he met with ]?
However, preposing to a higher clause is blocked from adjunct clauses,
relative clauses and subject clauses.19
a.(18) *the girl with whom he was sick [after he met ] adjunct clause
b. *the girl with whom the student died [that he met ] relative clause
c. *the girl with whom [that he met ] distrubed Mary subject clause
Preposing within and across clauses is also prohibited from coordinated
expressions.
(19) *With whom did John meet [Mary and ]?
Syntactic domains which disallow extraction are called islands, and a cru-
cial discovery of generative syntax is that they also have a detectable eﬀect
in languages which do not prepose their wh- phrases. As shown in (20),
in SVO Mandarin Chinese wh- phrases stay in situ; preposing leads to
ungrammaticality (21).
19 Note that this is not a language-speciﬁc (or language family-speciﬁc) constraint: the
Hungarian constituent questions below are just as ill-formed as the English relative
clause examples in the main text.
(i) a. *Kivel voltál beteg, [miután találkoztál ]?
who.with were sick after meet.PST.3SG
‘With whom were you sick after you met?’ adjunct clause
b. *Kivel halt meg a diák, [aki találkozik ]?
who.with die.PST.3SG prt the student REL.who meet.3SG
‘With whom did the student die that he met?’ relative clause
c. *Kivel [hogy János találkozott ], zavarta Marit?
who.with that John meet.PST.3SG disturb.PST.3SG Mari.ACC
‘With whom did it distrub Mary that John met?’ subject clause
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a.(20) Ni kanjian-le shei?
you see-ASP who
‘Who did you see?’ (Huang 1982, 253)
b. Wo xiang-zhidao Lisi mai-le sheme.
I wonder Lisi buy-ASP what
‘I wonder what Lisi bought.’ (ibid., 267) (Mandarin)
(21)*Shei ni kanjian-le ?
who you see-ASP
‘Who did you see?’ (Mandarin)
In spite of the lack of preposing, a wh- phrase in an embedded clause can
establish an interpretational relationship with a superordinate clause: in
the ﬁrst translation of (22), for instance, the wh- phrase is interpreted as
being in the matrix clause.
(22) Zhangsan zhidao [shei mai-le shu].
Zhangsan know who buy-ASP book
‘Who does Zhangsan know bought books?’
‘Zhangsan knows who bought books.’ (ibid., 254)
Yet this is possible only as long as the wh- item is in a complement clause
and not in an adjunct clause, a relative clause, a subject clause or a coordi-
nation, that is, in a syntactic domain that disallows extraction in English
(Ross 1967). In (23) the inclusion of weishenme ‘why’ results in ungram-
maticality.
a.(23) Ta [zai Lisi (*weishenme) mai shu yihou] shengqu le?
he at Lisi why buy book after angry PART
‘Why did he get angry after Lisi bought the books ?’ adjunct clause
b. Ni zui xihuan [(*wishenme) mai shu de ren]?
you most like why buy book PRT person
‘Why do you like the person who bought the books ?’ relative clause
c. [Wo (*weishenme) mai shu] zui hao?
I why buy book most good
‘Why is that I buy the books best?’ (based on Huang et al. 2009, 263)
Cross-clausal dependencies thus cannot cross certain syntactic domains,
and this has reﬂexes both in wh-ex-situ and wh-in-situ languages.20
20 For the sake of completeness, we should mention that not all wh- phrases show island
sensitivity in all wh-in-situ languages. In the relevant languages, including Mandarin,
Acta Linguistica Academica 66, 2019
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 328 / September 8, 2019
328 Éva Dékány
5.4. Particles, adverbs and sufﬁxes: isomorphy between syntax
and morphology
It has been known for quite some time from typology that if a language
expresses the categories of tense, aspect, mood and modality (TMA) with
pre-verbal particles, then they appear in the order ‘mood-tense-modality-
aspect’ (Bickerton 1974).
(24) Pyè te deja ap dòmi.
Pyè PST already PROG sleep
‘Pyè was already sleeping.’ (Cinque 1999, 63) (Haitian Creole)
If two or more particles within the same category can co-occur, then they
also do so in a ﬁxed order. For instance, if the particles of the habitual
and continuous aspect co-occur, then the habitual always precedes the
continuous (Cinque 1999).
(25) Àsíbá ná nɔ̀ tò kpikpon vi lé go.
Àsíbá FUT HAB PROG take care of the children
‘Àsíbá will frequently be taking care of the children.’ (ibid., 65) (Gungbe)
Generative grammar (esp. Cinque 1999) has uncovered that tense, aspect,
modality and mood related adverbs in languages without TMA particles
also conform to this order, and that this represents the underlying hierar-
chy of sentences. In (26) we see that in English the adverb of evaluative
mood (unfortunately) precedes the adverb of alethic possibility modal-
ity (possibly), which in turn precedes the adverb of completive aspect
(completely).
(26) Unfortunately John possibly completely forgot to water the plants.
Furthermore, if TMA categories are expressed by verbal suﬃxes, then they
appear in the reverse order ‘aspect-modality-tense-mood’; that is, morphol-
ogy mirrors syntax.21
island sensitive and island non-sensitive wh- phrases have structural diﬀerences (Tsai
1994; Murphy 2017). This does not diminish the importance of the discovery that
islands are also in eﬀect in wh- in situ grammars.
21 This is seen particularly clearly in languages in which pre-verbal particles and verbal
suﬃxes co-occur (i).
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(27) Tukua-tuka-na-puga-vaaci.
meat-eat-ASP.HAB-PST-MOOD.EVID.HEARSAY
‘She used to eat meat (so I hear).’ (Cinque 1999, 56) (Ute)
(28) Olvas-gat-hat-t-atok vol-na.
read-ASP.FREQ-MOD.POTENITAL-PST-2PL be-MOOD.COND
‘You could have read a bit every now and then.’ (Hungarian)
That syntax and morphology are isomorphous this way (the so-called Mir-
ror Principle or Mirror Generalization) is one of the most important gen-
eralizations contributed by generative syntax (Chomsky 1957; Muysken
1979).
6. Summary
The most important innovation of generative grammar is shifting the re-
search focus to the child’s language learning ability, and trying to capture
this ability with formal, explicit rules. Generative grammars assume that
the reason why children can acquire language with remarkable success in
spite of the poverty of stimulus is that humans have a species-speciﬁc and
domain-speciﬁc language faculty. The language faculty imposes structural
restrictions on possible human languages, and thus restricts the possible
hypothesis space regarding what the grammar of particular languages may
look like. This, in turn, aids the language learner in the discovery of the
underlying rules of his or her language.
Frameworks which reject the idea of a capacity specialized for lan-
guage assume that only domain-independent, more general cognitive func-
tions have a role to play in the acquisition and use of language. These
approaches must show how general cognitive functions and abilities can ex-
plain e.g., the uniﬁed constraints on constituent questions, contrastive foci
and relativization, island eﬀects in wh-ex-situ and wh-in-situ languages,
the syntax–morphology isomorphy mentioned in section 5, or the many
other linguistic generalizations in Svenonius (2016) and D’Alessandro (to
appear). Diﬀerent theories of language can only be compared on the basis
of their explanations of speciﬁc linguistic data, the most successful being
the one that can capture a wider range of empirical material with a smaller
theoretical apparatus.
(i) BéthOO an ɔ́-bôu-honx!ou-yii-t!OO-dei.
MIR HAB :3S:3I-always-come.late-IMPF-MOD-EVID
‘I didn’t realize he was going to keep on coming late.’ (Kiowa, Adger et al. 2010, 6)
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